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Martha .Davis:
I want to welcome everyone here today-the folks in the audience,
as well as our distinguished speakers and others who are going to
be participating in this afternoon's conversation on federalism.
Putting together a program that covers such a broad range of issues
and involves people from up and down the East coast is not simple.
I want to make sure that I acknowledge the important roles played
by the sponsors of this program, Albany Law School, the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Government Law Center
here at Albany Law School and Patty Salkin the Director of the
Government Law Center, and the Albany Law Review. The ALS
Environmental Outlook and Environmental Law Society also
contributed, as well as other folks from Albany who helped with
logistical issues.
One of the most important functions of higher education is not
specialization, it's the opposite, broadening visions and making
connections across substantive areas that sharpen our
understanding of the world around us. That project is both the
genesis of this conversation and also one of the things we hope to
achieve this afternoon. This extended conversation started when
Dave Markell and I started talking about our respective fields-I
work in the area of welfare and civil rights and Dave works in
environmental law-and we realized that in terms of federalism, we
had a lot to share with each other about what was happening in our
fields. Our thought was to broaden that conversation to include a
wider range of people and to include folks like you in the audience
as well. So we have assembled experts on civil rights, welfare, and
environmental law. We could have also included patent law, labor
law, international trade, and other areas where devolution is
becoming an issue.
What we want to do for the next two hours is explore the nature
of the trend of devolution and the national/state interests that are
implicated by these· shifts in responsibility through levels of
government. Among other things, we will be looking for lessons
that can be translated from one area to another.
At the end of the day I'm sure that federalism will continue to be
one of the most contentious and complex issues in U.S. governance.
We are not aiming to solve anything this afternoon. But, I hope this
conversation will illuminate some of ways that we can ensure that
people benefit from this bi-Ievel system. I want to turn it over now
to Dave Markell who will be our moderator. He is perfect for this
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task as someone with experience in state government, with the
federal system, and, most recently worked in Canada, so he has
international experience as well.

David Markell:
Thank you, Martha. Welcome everybody. We have four questions
to talk about today, as you can tell from the materials that were
provided. We are going to start with Peter Edelman, who will begin
our conversation by talking about some of the national interests
that are at stake in these areas.

Peter Edelman:
I'm going to talk about welfare and poverty and civil rights and
Shelley will talk about the environment. Much of what we assign to
national responsibility is based on values that we don't articulate.
It's based on attitudes that are not related so much to some intrinsic
facts about who can do what best, and much more to politics.
Poverty policy and welfare policy are rife with this. The spoken
justifications for the trends, in recent years in particular, relate to
the idea that states are closer to the people and, therefore, they
know what's best, and the federal government is very far away. I
would suggest that arrangements between the national government
and the state and local governments in this area relate more to the
hierarchy of attitudes that we have toward the poor, toward who is
deserving and who isn't.
The 1935 Social Security Act is a great example of what I'm
talking about because there, in the same piece of phenomenally
important legislation, we enacted three programs with differing
federal-state divisions of authority:
social security itself,
unemployment insurance; and, welfare in the name of a program
that became known as Aid to Families With Dependent Children.
Social security is a nationally administered program with nationally
set benefits. And I think, it is no accident that in our lexicon the
elderly are regarded as the most deserving.
Of course, the
beneficiaries of social security are not just poor people.
Unemployment insurance is at a middle level in terms of the
federal/state balance. For welfare, benefit levels were left entirely
to the states, and for thirty plus years it was tacitly assumed that
state and local bureaucracies would deal with poor people in
basically any way they wanted.
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What's the difference among those three? As far as I can tell, it's
a difference in our attitudes about who is the most deserving. If you
consider whether there might be a national definition of benefit
levels in welfare, you might well ask whether there is a state-bystate difference in people's needs.
There are some regional
differences in cost of living, but, otherwise, you eat, you need
shelter, and so on. The history of disability policy is very
interesting in this regard because from 1935 until 1972 (apart from
the addition of social security disability in the 1950s), disability was
handled as a welfare category. There were separate welfare
programs for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and they were
structured the way Aid to Families With Dependent Children was
structured. But, disability has gradually acquired acceptance as
being a more deserving category and in the Social Security Act
amendments of the 1950s and then with SSI, Supplemental
Security Income, in the early 1970s we created a national definition
and a the national floor. I would suggest that this was not because
we suddenly decided that the federal government could do a better
job than the states, but because there was a change in our attitudes
about who is deserving. Welfare recipients weren't regarded as
especially deserving in the first place, but the politics became even
more negative. There was an insistent drum beat that people were
too dependent, and on welfare for too long, so we decided we'll give
far more discretion to the states and have much less federal
oversight. I don't think that's a result of some elegant definition of
federalism; I think it's about politics.
Just a word about civil rights, since I've got that assignment here,
too, at least implicitly. Again, much of the issue is about values,
although in this case the last half of the twentieth century has seen
more positive change. But, we used to hear states' rights over and
over again. Those of us with gray in our hair will remember Sam
Ervin standing on the Senate floor in the 1960s with his version of
the Constitution that these matters of civil rights were really
matters of states' rights. Maybe he was in good faith, maybe not,
but it was certainly a code phrase for "don't tell us what to do about
segregation in the South." Then we enacted the 1964, 1965, and
1968 Civil Rights Acts, and the states' rights talk stopped. When
Judge Bork was nominated for the Supreme Court in the late 1980s
we were all waiting to see what he would say about Dred Scott and
Brown v. Board 0/ Education. He said that Dred Scott was one of
the worst decisions in history and he supported Brown v. Board 0/
Education. I won't go through the constitutional doctrine on those
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cases, but suffice to say that from a pure "Borkian" point of view
those were the wrong answers. The point is that we had arrived at
a broad consensus about the need for national law in this field,
although not to the exclusion of civil rights enforcement at the state
level. We should leave room for stronger civil rights enforcement at
the state level. But not weaker.
Now there is somewhat of a cloud of doubt that has been cast by
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Morrison, which
throws into question the continued validity of the Commerce Clause
justification for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. So, it is not an idle
question to ask just how radical this current Supreme Court is, and
just how dangerous it is in areas where we thought there was a
settled political and values consensus around the validity and merit
of exercising national power.

Shelley Metzenbaum:
You've asked me to talk to the national interests in
environmental law. I want to change the question a little bit, to
ask, what are the interests of the people in this country that the
national government is best able to serve? That gets me a little bit
away from debating "national interests" versus "state interests." I
fear that answering the question as you have asked it takes us
down a very philosophical path. I prefer to address this question
with a more practical bent.
First, consider two reasons that we think about government
playing a role in the environmental field. Two key reasons are
"externalities" and "commons problems." "Externalities" refers to
the ability of one party to impose costs on another party without
compensating that other party for the costs, as with pollution. To
deal with externalities, we establish environmental standards, or
sometimes we charge those people who are creating those costs,. so
that we'll get them to stop imposing those costs on other parties, or,
so that we can at least compensate the parties who have been forced
to bear the cost burden. There is no reason that the national
government, or the state government, or local government can't set
standards or establish charges. They can and they do. But those
standards and charges don't operate in a vacuum. If one state sets
a more stringent set of standards or costs than others it can be
perceived as an unfriendly signal to business about the business
climate in the state, and there's a very robust and brisk competition
to attract business. So, essentially one reason we have national
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environmental laws and standards is it functions as a cartel
agreement-a monopoly agreement among states-not to compete
away environmental quality.
The problem of externalities is often thought of in terms of a
business imposing costs on a community, but we also have
externality problems which can cross state lines, where one state
can impose costs on another state. Again, states could deal with
that state by state. But if they did, there would be enormous
transactions costs. They would have to negotiate every single time
water spilled across state lines causing contamination problems or
upsetting the ecological balance of downstream water bodies. So, to
some extent we have established national standards because it
reduces the transaction costs. It's just a much more efficient way of
dealing with environmental problems that cross state boundaries.
National standards can also reduce costs for companies that have
to operate in multiple jurisdictions. So, if we want to think about
the question of what benefits the people, and in this case the
business in this country, sometimes national standards are
attractive because it allows a company to respond with the same
kind of response in every state and not have to adapt to the codes or
environmental requirements of each individual state, or locality. Of
course, if you're a company and you're more powerful than the local
government or the state, you may, in fact, prefer the different
adaptations, because you know you can get a better deal even if you
have to deal state by state. If that's the case, when that occurs,
where you have a company that's more powerful, again you start to
see a reason for a national role, because the national government in
that case can counterbalance the power of the local business, what a
political scientist might refer to as the local elite.
I also mentioned commons problems. This is a term commonly
used by folks who do environmental policy. Commons problems
arise when rational decisions by many individuals would deplete a
community resource. It could, for example, refer to our water or our
air. We could easily overuse them, just following our individual
rational decision-making processes, and deplete resources beyond a
sustainable level, even though we might want to protect those
resources if asked. So, what we do in those cases, is we reach a
collective agreement among ourselves to protect what we call the
commons-to protect these resources.
Well, a lot of times those agreements are much easier to do when
they involve smaller groups and they're easier to do because you
have trust among the parties. The boundaries of commons, like
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water bodies, sometimes cross state lines, and, in that case, again,
you have very strong need for a national role.
Let me mention a few other reasons national action can be very
important. One, very simply, I think we should be able to trust the
safety of the air and water where we live and where we travel
throughout the United States. That has long been an expectation
that I think we have had as Americans. It's what Peter was talking
about in terms of values. I think we believe that we have a quality
of life in America that should entitle us, and I will use that word
entitlement without trying to get into big debates that erupt in
other policy areas on entitlement, but we should believe we are
going to have clean air and water wherever we live. I don't think
we want to lose that expectation about basic air and water quality
decency.
Increasing our confidence about what we consume is not only
important to consumers, it also can be important to producers.
Producers sometimes want national standards to build consumer
confidence. Fish producers, for example, have tried to get national
standards on quality of fish because they want to make consumers
comfortable that they don't need to worry about where the fish come
from; they can trust that the fish are safe to eat because of the
national standards. So, you have both a consumer and a producer
reason for national standards, in that case.
Finally, let me talk a little bit about economies of scale in
implementing regulatory programs.
There are significant
economies of scale. Setting standards requires research. It requires
evaluation of new technologies. It requires evaluation of program
design. It requires marketing so that those who are regulated know
what they need to do. All of those activities need to be done, and
you can do it one time or you can do it fifty times. And, it's certainly
a whole lot cheaper to do it one time. So, in that case it makes
sense to have some cooperation among the parties, to do research on
what the right water quality standard is.
It doesn't have to be the national government that would do that.
It could be a collection of states that have decided that they're going
to work together on those standards, on the research, or whatever.
The fact is though, while many states participate in interstate
collaborative efforts, very few of them, very few of the state
legislators have been willing to step forward and pay for that
activity. The federal government has funded most of that activity.
One other area that Peter alluded to was unemployment
insurance, there is a lot of risk sharing and risk spreading that's

HeinOnline -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1097 2000-2001

1098

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 64

best done at a national level. Or, it can be done on a national level
so that if you have a major incident in one location, the local
government doesn't have to bear the full cost of the loss. You can
think about it as what we do with federal emergency management.
And that happens in the environmental field a lot when you have
major environmental problems.
In sum, there are lots of reasons that we have a role, an
important role, a major role, a primary role in many cases, for the
national government.
So why bother with state and local government? Well, there are a
lot of reasons to have the state and local governments deliver some
of these services and I'm not going to go into them right now. What
I am going to say is that I think it is part of the brilliance of the
federalist system that we live in, that the line, the delineations
about roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined. And, as a
result, governments do compete to serve a shared set of citizens.
It's in that competition, in many ways, that our values can best be
served. We can go to a different level of government for responsive
policies, if one level is not meeting our needs. And so, the different
levels of government both compete for the shared citizenry and
check each other's powers, if the power of one gets too strong. I
think it's that constant tension rather than a clean delineation of
roles that is a critical part of the vibrancy of our democratic system.

David Markell·
Peter and Shelley have raised a couple of important questions.
One is, who should decide what national interests are, and the
second is whether there should be particular criteria that should
guide the decision makers in making that call. And I think implicit
in Peter's remarks is that, essentially, Congress has a role to play in
deciding what national interests are. Congress' decisions may not
always be entirely satisfactory. In fact, they may vary across a
range of activities in a way that sometimes doesn't make much
sense. But, Peter suggests that Congress is the ultimate decision
maker in terms of defining what a national interest is, constrained
by the courts basically.
Shelley offered some of the substantive criteria that might guide
Congress and others who are interested in deciding what the
national interests are-e.g., things like "a race to the bottom"
among states, "externalities," "commons problems." So, I would like
to pose those two questions to the other panelists. First, who should

HeinOnline -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1098 2000-2001

2001]

A Conversation on Federalism

1099

decide what national interests are and second, what should guide
those decision makers in making those calls?

Richard Nathan:
Just to make it interesting, I think there is another way to look at
what Peter was saying. He said that when you look at different
groups that are target groups for social policy, that it's a matter of
politics. The groups that are loved the most are going to get
national attention and national standards. An example that I'm
particularly going to talk about, where we have been doing a lot of
research, is welfare. Welfare is different from a cash payment
system for social security in that now in the 1996 Welfare Act,
which President Clinton signed, which creates block grants and
gives more power to the states. The idea of the law is to give people
different kinds of service assistance to help them get into the labor
force and stay in the labor force, deal with child care needs, and
deal with the needs of their family for health care services. You
could make an argument, Peter, that there is a very logical way of
thinking about this. If there are criteria, if what you want to do is a
service function, that has to be lower in terms of the assignment of
governmental responsibilities. That's not something that national
government can orchestrate, manage, and implement. So, I think
there is more to it than just politics. There are strengths in our
federal system and reasons why we ought to be careful. Not just to
talk about needs and say, "states are not up to it or the local
governments will, some of them, do it badly." There are arguments
I'd like to be sure that are made about diversity-different needs,
different standards, and different values in a country where
communities become engaged in meeting certain kinds of needs,
Peter. I disagree with you. I think there is a way to look at
allocating functions in our kind of a federal system that involves
more than just politics.

Martha Davis:
I'll surprise myself and add my partial agreement with Dick. I
wonder to what extent it is valid to rely on historical arguments to
justify the balance between federal and state power.
The
counterargument is that now we have states which are much more
capable than they were, even in recent years, with the advent of the
Internet, etc., to develop bureaucracies to provide services in a way
that IS III communication with the federal government,
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communication with other states. Maybe we're in a new era where
some of the arguments about history no longer apply. When I think
about what the national interests are, in welfare and civil rights,
that there is no inherent reason to think that the national and state
interests would be different. In fact, states and the federal
government have the same interest in promoting the well-being of
citizens, and promoting opportunities for people to exercise their
civil rights. There is no reason that a state would have a different
interest than the federal government. What the federal government
has that is different from the state is an interest in continuity and
consistency across the country, making sure that there is even
handedness. Also, the federal government may have international
obligations that states are not so party to. So, the federal
government may have international accountability that the states
don't have, that may influence the way the federal government
would approach civil rights, welfare, and the environment.
Peter Edelman:
I always know that I shouldn't leave out something that I have
made a note to say. In fact, Dick, I take your point, but only up to a
point. Because when we started thinking about welfare in a way
that is more work-oriented, which I support if it's done right, the
subject did acquire some aspects that have to be locally developed.
So the specifics of a welfare to work system do differ somewhat from
place to place. I also take your point· that function partly
determines the appropriate federal-state role. Public education is a
local responsibility in this country for some very good reasons,
without getting into the details of where we should have state
standards and so on. But on welfare, and here's the point where
maybe we do disagree, I think we went way too far in the 1996 law.
There should be some national standards about benefit levels, and
some national protection against arbitrariness and against the
exceptionally bad policies that we have in some of our states.
Peter Lehner:
Let me join for a moment to emphasize that there are two
elements to this issue. One element is the standards and another is
the implementation of the standards. The federal environmental
laws are structured to draw a very big distinction between these
elements. The federal government sets the standards for clean air
or clean water, and then leaves it to the state governments to
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implement air and water policies to achieve them. The federal
standards have, by and large, been set at relatively stringent levels,
as Shelley said, with a lot of research going into, for example,
setting the concentration in parts per million of ozone that is safe to
breathe. That takes a lot of research. It makes sense for those
standards to be set by the federal government. Even if there may
be differences in how people live, the basic human body is the same
anywhere around the country. But, what has worked less well in
the federal system is the implementation of those federal standards.
Thus, in thinking about this, it makes sense to draw a very big
distinction between standards and implementation of those
standards.
There is one other point, relating to the historical view of where
we're all coming from and how we end up here. I believe the federal
environmental laws did not primarily come about for the reason
that Shelley was talking about-because of the pollution crossing
state boundaries. They came about because states hadn't done the
jobs and the economic race to the bottom. The water was dirty.
Rivers were catching on fire. People were choking to death. After
years and years of the states saying, "no, we can deal with this,
leave it to us," and resisting federal intrusion into environmental
policy, the country said, "hey, this isn't working." It really didn't
have to do with the more analytical explanation of interstate
pollution. It simply had to do with the fact that the states had been
unable to control the pollution.
Don Friedman:
This is sort of some sniping. When you said that history maybe
doesn't provide us with guidance. I would say that the change in
states' capacity to do things wasn't the reason they weren't doing
them before. What comes to mind the most notably is civil rights, if
you will. That's a critical point.
Going back to the overall topic of goals, I just want to point out
that while it's a worthwhile discussion, I think it's a dangerous area
because so often goals are misstated by the bodies that are
announcing those policies, purposely or for some reason misstating
the goals, or the goals are unstated or implicit. The Welfare Law
states right up front four goals. One is to help the needy. One is
get them work, promote families, etc. I would say the closest thing
the Personal Responsibility law comes to really articulating a goal is
in the two places in the law where it says nothing in this law should
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be construed to say that there is an entitlement anymore. That
comes, for me, to being closer to what the law is really about.
Another example of misstating or unstated goals is the use of
block grants. I am now thinking, not so much this law, as right
before this, when President Reagan started doing it. And a lot of
the justification for his initiatives had to do with federalism and
devolution and the lower the level to administer something the
better they can do it. The better they understand people. What it
was really about was tax funds. They took a whole bunch of
programs, they eliminated sixty programs. They combined seventyseven programs into nine super block grant programs and cut
overall funding to that totality by twenty-five percent. That is what
was really going on there.
It's a very tough discussion, who should articulate the goals, who
should set the goals, etc. But there is danger there, when we
analyze stated goals.

Erik Olson:
I would agree. It is exactly the same way in the environmental
field. We hear quite a bit about getting closer to the state and local
governments. I would step back and look at the realities of what is
going to happen. We hear these lofty arguments as to why we need
to do this, but when we actually see what the implications are and
what actually happens, I think the bottom line is that the folks that
are advocating this most vigorously and funding it most vigorously
are the ones that essentially have captured the agencies at the state
level, at least in the environmental field. I think that there is just
enormous industry power at the state and local level. There is a
potential for brown mail, as it's often called, where the industry can
say, "Well, if you crack down on us, we're out of this state or out of
this locality." That kind of problem really cannot be dealt with
unless there is a major federal presence. So, what I look at is the
realities. I think the reasons for the lack of political will at many
state and local levels, and the reasons for efforts to send things back
down to the state and local levels, often is to deregulate.

Shelley Metzenbaum:
I'm going to speak a little bit to your issue about the validity of
historic analysis. At the end of my comments, which were quite
theoretical, I said something about states and the different levels of
government competing with each other to serve the citizenry. My
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experience in this field has been that so many of these decisions are
about fixing the problems in these systems. So, for example, in
welfare, as I understand-where it had evolved, the welfare
program had primarily become a cash transfer system, as much as
anything, and people who used to be social service workers were, in
fact, now simply check writers, even though in many cases their
training was in social service. They didn't even have the authority
to do more than that and they were frustrated that they couldn't
knit their services together to serve their clients better.
Certainly in the environmental area, eight or nine years ago when
I first started working at E.P.A., after working at a state level, so
many of the changes that we tried to make, to give more flexibility
to the states, were because of the frustration of a lot of innovators at
the state level. These were folks who were very committed to
improving environmental quality, and they were frustrated because
they had to deal with making their programs work on the ground.
They found their program improvement efforts-designed to
improve environmental quality-seriously constrained by the little
boxes Washington had created to manage its grant monies. Now,
we are probably going to get a reaction again because we're going to
go too far on the flexibility pendulum, and so people are going to try
to shove things back in boxes again. And probably for good reason,
because the flexibility pendulum is moving too far.
So, I think so much of this federalism debate is a debate driven by
history and the challenge of implementing the programs.
Bureaucracies get rigid. So, whether it's the state bureaucracy, the
local bureaucracy, or the federal bureaucracy, you want to have one
butt up against the other to make them actually remember why
they're doing the job they're doing. You want to force them to
change to be more effective and responsive to the citizens.

David Markell:
To wrap up concerning our first issue, the conversation reflects
that there are many different ways of approaching the question of
national interests. One of them is looking at politics. Another is
looking at functions. A third is looking at respective capacities of
different levels of government to perform certain kinds of services.
Suffice it to say, at this point, that there is a lively debate about
what national interests are, how they should be defined, and who
ought to define them.
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Let's now move to issue two, which involves the extent to which
national interests that do exist are being protected through the
federal system that we are implementing today. This raises Peter
Lehner's "implementation" issue head on.

Andrew Cell&:Thanks. I'm a practitioner and an enforcement lawyer and I feel
a little uncomfortable with all this very lofty discussion. But, I
want to bring my own personal perspective on something a little
more, for me anyway, practical, and I should start by saying my
name is Andy Celli and I'm a born-again Federalist. I have
shunned this for years, but I finally reached middle age and now I
have welcomed federalism into my life. If my political biography,
which will never be written, were ever written, there would be a
new chapter: I would be a liberal, a civil libertarian, a civil rights
lawyer, and a Federalist. The signs were there all along: in college
I thought that Jefferson's yeoman farmers were cooler than
Hamilton's First Bank of the United States. In law school, I
thought that Brandeis' hypothesis of the states as little laboratories
was a really intriguing idea. But, I couldn't get past the fact that,
throughout our history, federalism-and, more specifically, the
argument that there should be independent sovereign power at the
state level-that this idea has been used as cover for institutional
racism, Jim Crow, and segregation. So, I rejected this idea of state
power, thought it was an anachronism, and I worshiped at the altar
of federal power. The Supreme Court, the Justice Department,
particularly the Kennedy Justice Department, the E.E.O.C. These
were the shrines of my youth.
But think of where we are at the turn of the millennium. We had
a democratic president who signed into law some of the most
punitive welfare legislation in U.S. history. We have a Congress
that refused to confirm Bill Lann Lee as the Head of the Civil
Rights Division because he was viewed as too extreme. And I found
myself rooting for seven elected state judges in a pitched battle with
the Supreme Court over voting rights in the deep South. So, I don't
think I've changed; it's the world that's changed. And, there is one
other small matter that I would like to mention which is that the
State Attorney General asked me to head up his State Civil Rights
enforcement office for the State of New York. So, federalism has
become my personal savior.
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The question is, is it our national savior in some way? I don't
know the answer to that, but I can tell you what I saw in
devolution. I saw that, in the civil rights arena-and this really
goes to Peter's point about standards-that the playbook and the
basic rules of the game are, and will continue to be, the historic
Federal Civil Rights Laws. New York State, and not many people
know this, has some of the oldest civil rights laws on the books, they
were passed in the early 1940s. But when we enforce the law
through the AG.'s office and we look for expansive interpretations,
we look at the Civil Rights Act of 1877, the Civil Rights Act of '64,
the Voting Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and more recently the
AD.A and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. These
are the fundaments of civil rights enforcement. These are the tools
that I use in my practical life everyday. And, so these standards, at
the Federal level, are what we look to.
I also saw that state enforcement officers, like me and like Peter
Lehner, with our small and agile offices operating below the
national political radar, that we can use these federal laws in
creative and aggressive ways and perhaps in a way that is insulated
from the kinds of political pressure that, say, the Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department faces. For instance, we have a
continuing case involving predatory lending where we use a very
old, very unused, law called the Equal Credit Opportunities Act.
When we described to our adversary our theory under E.C.O.A as
to why they were liable for targeting Mrican-American and Latino
borrowers for the worst kind of loans, the guy said to us, ''You guys
are out on the frontier." Which we took as a great complimentespecially when, two months later, his client signed an enormous
consent decree based on our lawsuit in federal court, based on our
frontier theory. So, I think that state officers can act in ways that
are beyond or below, maybe, political pressure to do the kind of
things that the national interests wants us to do, as expressed in
the federal civil rights laws.
Finally, the other thing that I saw with devolution was that,
although state enforcement efforts may appear to lead to a
patchwork of inconsistent rules-and this point may only apply in
civil rights and less so in environmental law-I'd like to hear what
Peter has to say-the need for large corporations, who are usually
our targets, to standardize their operations and to create rational
systems for doing business can result in a single state's enforcement
of changing national behavior patterns. We have seen that in the
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work that we've done in predatory lending and other areas.
that's my perspective on the question.

So,

David Markell'
Thanks, Andy. It's fascinating that you and Peter Lehner took
opposite sides of the same question. Peter said, basically, that
you've got federal standards and then you've got the
implementation side, which is where things are lacking in the
federal system. You seem to be suggesting that you've got federal
standards and that states can be more nimble and effective in
actually doing the implementation work.
Andrew Cellt:·
What I'm saying is that the idea of federalism and the power at
the state level is a vehicle for pursuing whatever your ideological
agenda might be. And if you have an ideological agenda on the left
and you have basic standards at the federal level, you can do some
good work.
Erik Olson:
I have to agree with you, I think in all the areas we've talked
about today, you're going to have some states that are out in front,
in the frontier, trying to push things in favor of the federal
standards that have been enunciated. But, the question is, what
altar would you be worshipping at if you were in Mississippi or if
you were in Louisiana, on an environmental matter? I guess that's
the question. Just the same way one state can make great law, in
interpreting federal statutes to advance things, one could argue one
state can make horrible law to undercut things, if they so choose. I .
wonder how you would answer that.
Andrew Cellt:Well, I'm glad I'm not from Mississippi, that's the first thing. I
guess what I would say is that you have to exercise power where it
exists, and I would come back to the point that it really depends on
your ideological agenda. The fact of the matter is that there is not
going to be the kind of enforcement Peter would like in the
environmental area in Mississippi.
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You would be surprised at the civil rights enforcement, however,
in states like Mississippi. Given the choice between nothing at the
federal level and something at the state level, or at some states'
levels, I'll pick something.

Don Friedman:
It seems that, with regards to civil rights, as inadequate as

federal activity is now, at least it provides a floor so that in some
ways the states are only free to do better, as I would define better,
and not worse. I don't think it worked in the area of welfare, I think
it's different. Let me just try to shoehorn a few things, anomalies,
into the question to address this. I was told that you're supposed to
decide what you're going to say and say it, no matter what you're
asked. I have the power of the chair!
I approach this as a welfare advocate and my perspective is
completely skewed, I would say, by looking at things through the
warped, perhaps cracked, prism of living and working in New York
City. And, it really shapes, in a very serious way all of my thinking
on this issue, in fact, it completely governs my thinking on this
Issue.
The other thing I would say is the direct answer to the question,
to what extent are the national interests protected, if one of the
national interests is to let homelessness increase, then the national
interest is being protected by welfare reform. On today's front page
of the Times, is an article stating that at the height of a ten-year
economic boom, "homeless shelters in New York filled to highest
levels since 1980." Some of that may have to do with other things,
but clearly some of it has to do with the devolution in welfare
reform.
We've already discussed about how you would define the national
interest and the problems there of defining the national interests. I
won't go through that except to say I'll substitute my own interest
for what I would like to see the national interest in the area of
welfare. That everybody who needs it be given a decent income so
they can survive, we can afford that, and that people should get an
opportunity to improve their life situation. And, that is clearly not
the goal that has either been articulated or carried out through
welfare reform.
The next question that I thought we need to address concerning
federalism: is it a salient factor in this world.
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First, I would say that, as long as society at large and the political
world at large define the problem of poverty as one of individual
blame and not structural, having to do with society and economics,
it doesn't really matter what level of government is in control, we're
in trouble. Something else is the notion that devolution or
federalism can give states the opportunities to do good things. It
made me think that what I might spend most of the rest of my
introductory time doing, is to discuss an issue commonly raised in
the welfare context, that is, fraud.
Welfare advocates generally must address welfare fraud, but I am
concerned with devolution fraud. Why is it that Congress took
about 130 pages to write, "we are devolving all the authority of
governing to the states." Because they were, in fact, setting
incredibly strict limits on what the states could do. If my idea is
right, in the civil rights context, the states could only do better. In
welfare, I believe the states could only do worse, under this setup.
Let me just list a few of the ways that is true. The states have
participation rates they are bound by. They have to have a certain
percentage of adults engaged in work activities. What is work
activity? Work activity, essentially, very heavily discourages
involvement in education and training activity, and is very heavily
skewed and biased towards workfare, where they learn no skills and
then have no chance of getting a job. Participation rate can be
reduced by caseload reduction. So, if they are worried about
suffering financial penalties in a state because they can't meet their
participation rates, one of the ways they can reduce that
participation rate is by cutting their caseload. Last year, just to
give you an example, the legally mandated rate of participation in
New York was about forty percent; given the caseload reduction
factor the actual participation rate was eight percent. This was the
effect of the caseload having been reduced by more than thirty
percent. So, there is a great incentive to reduce the caseload.
Another example is the block grant idea, which I already
discussed, the effect of which might be masked right now because of
the decline in the rolls, but this is actually a way to cut funding.
Another way that devolution works is the time limits. As we
know, under the current welfare law, people can receive federal
welfare funds for no more than five years. States are free to make
the period shorter, there is no option to make the period longer, in
case you feel the person needs more time. There is a little hardship
protection, but it is not nearly enough. Sanctions. The states must
punish noncompliance with the rules. There is no leeway on that;
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the only leeway is either just punish the individual or close the
whole case. There is no leeway to do other things that might avoid
punishment.
Perhaps the most important factor in welfare-the benefit levelhas always been a matter of state choice. That one has been
devolved forever, and it's why, even before the social experiment of
devolution happened, every state looked dramatically different in
the welfare realm, because benefits were dramatically different in
different states. An historical example from a few years ago, that I
think is a great example of devolution in action in the welfare area,
and that is that for many years the federal government had
something called "quality control." They still do but, under the old
system of quality control, states could be penalized for overpaying
people, but would not be penalized for underpaying people. That's
devolution that only goes one way, in the direction of allowing you
to punish, or worse.
Let me just finish by noting that, in a form of devolution just prior
to welfare reform, states were allowed to get waivers of existing
welfare -laws to try some experiments. What was the one catch?
Anything they did had to be cost neutral. That means it couldn't
cost more than the state was already spending on welfare. Most of
the things I am in favor for states to experiment with probably cost
more money. Those things can't be done.
The last thing I have to say is that perhaps the most important
devolution has not been the devolution from federal to state, but
from state to local, and maybe even from local to individual
caseworker, as well as another form of devolution, from local to
private, and now increasingly local to faith-based, and we'll see how
that plays out. I will finish by saying that in New York City, our
mayor initiated welfare reform long before federal welfare reform
was adopted. What welfare reform did was it legalized the illegal
things he was doing .pre-1996, and gave him a license to set a tone
that said it's okay to conduct welfare policy that simply punishes
people, and to erect huge barriers so people can't even get into the
welfare center to apply. So I guess, as you can see, my perspective
is very dominated by what happened in New York City. Devolution
has meant licensing complete closing of access for poor people to the
system.
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David Markell·
Peter Lehner IS gomg to talk about the extent to which the
national interest is being protected in the environmental area. As
you can tell, the context in the civil rights arena is very different
from that which exists in the welfare area, in terms of whether the
federal government establishes a floor that states have to adhere to,
or whether it frees the states to do whatever they want.

Peter Lehner:
It is interesting that the federal/state structure in environmental
laws sets a federal minimum and gives the states the ability to do
more. We just painted a picture of a law as having the opposite
structure. What Andy and I were talking about is that the
implications of federalism are very often dictated by practical
concerns. The implementation of laws is usually better at the
federal level than at the state but, in a few instances, the states are
more aggressive. So, in a sense, federalism as a theory is value
neutral. State power could be more or less environmental, more or
less favorable to civil rights. As a practical matter, it has had a
fairly anti-environmental history so far.
It's also interesting to look at what is also happening in current
Supreme Court cases. At the same time you have Supreme Court
cases that talk about federalism-cases that I would argue are far
more just an effort to reduce environmental standards-you also
have dormant commerce clause cases that are limiting state power.
When states do try to experiment, industry comes in and says,
"we've got a global economy, and if you make us do this, it's going to
be an unfair burden." The Supreme Court, at the same time it is
limiting federal power, is also limiting state power. So the notion
that we are limiting federal power in order to enhance the states', is
not only shown to be somewhat false in the Welfare Reform Act
context, but is also shown false in other areas of jurisprudence.

Peter Edelman:
I think it's important to recognize that we had between the late
1880s and the late 1930s a no-person's zone. The Supreme Court
said that there is no federal power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate, and no state power for substantive due process reasons to
regulate. So a lot of activity went unregulated until we had the
"switch in time." We've got the beginnings of the same thing
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developing again here, and it is very important to notice that and
for there to a robust public debate about it. We have new Supreme
Court cases cutting into the federal power under the Commerce
Clause. We have federal Supreme Court decisions that cut into
federal power to regulate states because of the Eleventh
Amendment. And, we have now the Boy Scout case that says there
is some kind of new constitutional right limiting the state power to
regulate in the areas of civil rights. So we have a danger that we
are having a contemporary reincarnation of the no-man's land that
we had from the 1880s to the 1930s.

Richard Nathan:
We could have used historical examples to make the point. We
have to remember that in that same period, the 1920s, the federal
government did not act in many areas. It was the progressive
initiatives of states for unemployment insurance, child welfare, or
retirement systems. It was Wisconsin, New York, and Minnesota.
The state role could be different, and the activist energies that you
would like to see advanced, along with the ideas that you would like
to see advanced, may not come from Washington in conservative
periods, indeed like the one we are in. We could have a long
discussion about welfare, which you would need a whole two-hour
session to get deeply into. But, it never was just a matter of
implementation. AFDC was always as long as you wanted to make
it. The fact of the matter is, that AFDC benefits have risen, because
states have raised the monetary benefits to encourage new
recipients to stay in the labor force. It has risen more under this
new law throughout the country, than in the previous period, when
we had a national law which wasn't very good either, by your
standards. There isn't a reason for always saying "let's do it in
Washington, because then I can do it better." In fact, in different
periods of our history, things that we wanted to do, activists in
government, being upfront and helping people and leading the way
in a good cause-it hasn't always come from Washington. The same
voters vote for the people that represent us here in this state capitol
that vote for the people that we just got elected in Washington.

Martha .Davis:
One more point on the question of civil rights floor. I think one of
the reasons that we included civil rights in this conversation is the
feeling that because of u.s. v. Morrison and because of the Eleventh
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Amendment cases, that the federal floor is starting to develop holes.
A good example of the anomalies that have been created is the Age
Discrimination Act case-the Kimel case-where now state
employees can no longer invoke federal protections of the Age
Discrimination Act if they are discriminated against by a state
employer. Andy, you can tell me-how have states have responded
to that? Have they said, "Great! Now we can set whatever
standards we want." Or, have they said, "Oh, gosh, we feel
terrible-this group of employees is not being protected in
accordance with the way every other employee is, and so therefore
we are going to enact statutes that give them that protection," in
acknowledgment of the apparent national interest articulated in the
Age Discrimination Act.

Andrew Geltz:I think they said, "Great!" I think Peter Lehner was being a little
too kind when he said federalism is content neutral. I spoke to a
friend of mine who argued the Dale case-the Boy Scout case-in
the Supreme Court, and he said that he thought the most important
part of the argument when he got up there were the first five words
that he said, which were "The State of New Jersey." Of course, they
love states up there, right? And, of course, he lost. And, then we
have Bush v. Gore, where suddenly we have the majority of the
court extolling the virtues of the Equal Protection Clause over state
power. So, let's not kid ourselves about what's really going on here.

Peter Edelman:
I want to say Dick, there is a theme here that looks like a
difference, but that particular difference is not there. There are
many areas where we want to encourage states to be experimental
and creative. But, the history I was citing was that the Supreme
Court squelched the states and wouldn't let them innovate. Part of
the change in the Roosevelt Court was to support the ability of the
states to experiment. Similarly, some of the more successful areas
of civil rights and the environment are as a cooperative federalism
where you have the baseline national floor and the capacity of
states to do more, which accords with what you've said about
creative state action. What I am concerned about in the welfare
area is that we lack a baseline to keep the states from doing really
bad things, while still allowing them to do the good things that
some states are doing.

HeinOnline -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1112 2000-2001

2001]

A Conversation on Federalism

1113

.David Markell:
Fair enough. That's actually a perfect transition to the third
topic. The third topic is to look at, in particular, the kinds of
policies that have been effective in the federal system in achieving
national interests, essentially, the question of what works. Dick, if
you could turn your attention to that.

Richard Nathan:
I don't want to engage in the kind of deep contemplation of
policies in a particular functional area that some of us know a lot
about, and that we differ on, or interpret in a different way. What
we want to think about is what are the benefits of federalism. And,
one benefit of federalism is that we can allow for diversity, for
experimentation, for communities with different values and
different needs, to have their community deal with things in ways
that suit them. Federalism can be a way of reconciling unity and
diversity. It permits experimentation. It gives citizens more ways
in which they can identify with the community, communities doing
things to be what are regarded as public needs.
So, I think that we want to try to put at the top of this discussion
whether we want this balance to shift. One of the most interesting
things in my experience is to watch how the courts have interpreted
the welfare clause in the Constitution. Now the current court, in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's famous decision, the Garcia decision,
where the court went five to four in favor of a federal rule in the
particular area. His one-liner was, "We'll get you next time." These
are not intrinsic matters of right and wrong, morally or even in
operational terms of who can do something necessarily.
But, I wanted to pause on that just for a minute and use what
may be another thirty seconds of my time to say that I think you
should have chosen education for this topic today. Because we are
about to enter into a great debate where the President says, "Well, I
believe in states. We are Republicans." What we want to have is
tests at every grade level. Now, what kind of tests are going to
satisfy that federal requirement? Who is going to say what those
tests are? It is going to be an interesting debate that really hasn't
been firmed up. Seven percent of the total spending for public
elementary and secondary education in the country is federal, so
ninety-three percent of what we spend for education is state and
local.
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Do Americans want to make the argument that there are certain
kinds of things that you can't do from the center as well as you can
do them in the community, in ways that reflect what different
people need and want in their lives, and what the conditions are in
the community. There are attributes of this reconciling unity and
diversity that involve diversity as being advantageous for certain
kinds of things that you chose not to standardize, or formulaize, or
oversee from a national government. If what you care about now is
that people are needy we should help them work, that's a very
complicated idea. It involves all kinds of things that some
governments are doing much better than they used to do before. If
what you want to do is help families make it, and families are very
complicated things, having very different conditions with all kinds
of health, mental health, child abuse, family violence, child care,
transportation, education needs. You need to think about where
that kind of relationship can take into account, not just the
diversity of the country but the diversity of human needs for
families with children. This is constantly shifting balance. Pretty
soon all my liberal friends may hate national government. And,
maybe that's a good thing. Maybe this equilibrating, Brandeis
called ours great laboratories of federalism, maybe this
equilibrating capability which the founders put into that great
document is a benefit to society. But I hope that we can stay at a
high note plane, David, to think about principles of government and
not to worry just about where certain issues stand today .

.David Markell'
One of the questions in terms of what systems or policies have
been effective is actually to look at some of the implementation
issues that Peter Lehner alluded to before. What have states been
doing to experiment, to try to make things better. Andy alluded to
it before, as well. And, where have some of the experiments, the
laboratories of democracy, paid dividends? Peter, can you talk a
little bit about that?

Peter Lehner:
If I can, just two comments on what was said. First, you were
talking about the President's proposals for education-that there
should be tests but it is up to the states to decide what the tests are.
Although it strikes me as a facially absurd notion, the E.P.A. just
promulgated a rule that says that pesticide applicators should be
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tested, but that E.P.A. will leave it up to the states to say what the
tests are and, thus, when one can apply poisons in an acceptable
manner. So the President wasn't the first to come up with this idea.
He was just punting, with a token nod toward the federal role and
then leaving it to the states.
Second, I would say that you are right that it would be great to
have a conversation where we could discuss federalism as a
principle. But I would argue that, as it is evolving over the last
twenty years, federalism is largely unprincipled. It is not an effort
to provide more power to the states, because if that were the case,
then you wouldn't have these Commerce Clause cases eviscerating
the ability of states to have more aggressive environmental
regulation. One area in which we see this clearly is the area of
actual enforcement. We often view federalism as a zero-sum game:
there is a certain amount of power to be exercised and it is either
the feds or the states who will exercise it, but it is not both; cut back
the feds, and the assumption is that somehow the states will fill in
that role. If you look at actual enforcement, though, that's not the
case. The federal environmental laws are structured so that most
enforcement is left to the states. The federal government sets the
standards and designs what a program should look like, and then,
in almost all cases, delegates that program to the state governments
to implement. The state governments issue the actual permits
under federal guidance. They are the ones who send out the
inspectors. They are the ones who bring enforcement actions in the
first instance. But, the federal government is supposed to have an
oversight role. They are supposed to be there, so if the states don't
enforce, the federal government can directly enforce. A sort of
gorilla in the closet. However, what is happening in the last few
years, especially, is that when the federal government does try to
enforce, it gets clobbered. E.P.A. is told that its enforcement budget
is going to get cut, or whatever else. So the federal government is
now more wary to enforce. The result of that, though, is that there
has been less state enforcement. Without the gorilla in the closet,
the states are saying, "hey, I don't have to enforce." They will
welcome anyone they want with open arms, anyone who wants to
pollute. The result has not been that less federal power means
more state power, but just the opposite-less federal involvement,
when it comes to actual implementation, means less state
involvement. So, when you look at it from that point of view, it's a
very different vision of federalism than this either-the-states-or-thefeds vision.
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Now, going back to what has worked and what hasn't. As I
mentioned, there is a general consensus that the federal
government has done a moderately good job in the environmental
area in setting standards that are relatively protective of human
health and the environment. And, some states have done a
relatively good job of enforcing those, but the majority of the states
have been relatively slack. The Clean Air Act, when in was passed
in 1970, expected there would be clean air-air safe to breathe-by
1977. We still have over 100,000,000 Americans breathing air that
the federal government says isn't safe enough to breathe. The
Clean Water Act, passed in 1972, expected that we wouldn't need
this whole permitting structure because there wouldn't be any more
discharges of pollutants by 1985. Waters would fishable and
swimmable by 1985. Well, the most recent survey shows that about
one-third of our waters aren't close to being fishable and
swimmable, and those are only the waters that we have actually
looked at. So, something clearly has gone wrong and it's largely
state implementation.
But it's interesting to ask the question, "what has gone right?"
One of the things that has made an extraordinary difference is that
all the federal environmental statutes, except for one, provide for
citizen suits. They allow the individual who is harmed to bring a
suit, not against the government, but against the polluter directly.
Virtually no state allows any citizen suits. New York has a few very
specific citizen suit provisions. We did a survey a few years ago and
found that, by and large, no state has any effective citizen suit
provision in the environmental arena. The fact that federal citizens
suits are out there scares the regulated community to an
extraordinary degree. You can capture an agency, as somebody
talked about, but you can't capture the environmentalists or
community groups. That forces polluters to think that they should
comply because they can't be guaranteed that they won't be
enforced against.
Another thing that the federal environmental laws have done
quite well is to require a fair amount, not enough in most
circumstances, but a fair amount, of reporting and to require that
all those reports be publicly available. Implementation has not
always been perfect, but there is quite a bit of information about
pollution that you get from a database. Sometimes you have to go
to local or state agency offices to get some files. Now you can get a
lot on the web. This information provides citizens with an
extraordinary tool to raise the profile of an issue in their local
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community if nothing else. There is a debate going on now about
electronic filing of pollution reports. Many companies originally
advocated that because it would be a lot easier. Then they realized,
"Oh, my goodness. If I electronically file, boom, it's up on a web
page. It's not lost in some office down in New Paltz or someplace,
and that means that anybody can find it." So now the general
position of the reporting industries is that they do not want
electronic filing anymore. It's an interesting statement on the
power of information. But it also shows another program that has
worked in the federal environmental laws.
Similarly, the National Environmental Policy Act requires
agencies to, in essence, look before they leap. It tells the federal
government to think about the environmental consequences before
it undertakes an action. Many states have passed similar laws
requiring state and local governments to consider environmental
consequences before they take an action. And again, there are a lot
of questions of how well they've worked. But what they have
definitely done is given citizens the opportunity to say "you haven't
thought about this enough." And they have offered to citizens
litigation options to change that situation. Through litigation, a
citizen has an opportunity, instead of being powerless, to actually
enter into the debate and, if nothing else, delay a project for a
couple of years and, therefore, have some bargaining power.
So, interestingly, the common theme of all of the programs that
have worked is not devolution from the federal government to the
states, but from the federal government directly to individuals; how
they empowered individuals in a way that states have never been
willing to do. That is a pretty telling statement of how federalism is
working.
Another side of this issue is to ask what has worked for state
governments. Is carrying out federal mandates where they've done
a good job? Is it through the implementation of federal programs?
Sometimes. But in some ways, at least in the environmental arena,
we've been able to be most creative and most aggressive going back
to good old-fashioned common law, something that predates the
federal structure. We just today, by the way, had a great seven-zip
decision in the Court of Appeals affirming the public trust
doctrine-that certain land is held in trust by the public and that
local governments can't use it for non-park purposes without going
to the state legislature. This doctrine goes back to Roman times.
So, in some ways, where the states have been most effective has not
been in what the federal government has given them, but in
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common law and the public trust provisions of law that long predate
our federal structure. That again, is a telling commentary on
federalism.
I would offer one last thought on why it is that state governments
have by and large not taken the opportunities given to them by the
federal laws and done better. I would offer two words on that,
which are "campaign finance."

Andrew Celll>
Just a very quick point. I mean, your point about devolution for
individuals applies equally, if not more so, in the civil rights arena.
The impact of fee-shifting, requiring defendants to pay winning
plaintiffs in civil rights cases on enforcement, on private
enforcement efforts, is enormous. There would be no private civil
rights enforcement-my former law firm would be dust-if it were
not for fee shifting. That's an example of federal government
priorities being enforced by individual citizens, and I think that is a
great model.

Shelley Metzenbaum:
I just want to try to extract two lessons I'm hearing about things
that are working. What works in terms of the national role. I'm
talking about the national government, instead of the federal,
because I think that the federalist government is both the state and
national government. Peter, when you talk about laws that work
(by the way, I think your comment about the need for national
standards in the education system is right on point), I think we've
got two lessons from the' environmental area.
One is the Clean Air Act, where there are very clear national
standards, what I'll call a floor of decency where the federal
government, the national government, sets up minimum standards
for air quality. That's in contrast to the Clean Water Act where the
states are supposed to set the standards. In fact, they have not
done it, in most cases. So, under the Clean Air Act, you have this
floor of national decency, you also have required measurement of
states meeting that floor, and you have sanctions if they're not
making that floor of decency. It's a law that's working pretty darn
well.
There is a provision of another law which is called the Toxic
Release Inventory, and it requires companies to report in a
standard method the quantity of toxics they release to the
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environment. Now, there are problems with TRI, but it's better
than what existed before.
Companies have to report TRI
information in the same way across the country, more or less. Just
by putting that information out to the public, we have begun to see
real reductions in corporate release of toxics to the environment.
I think these two examples teach us a lesson on the education
debate, which is coming up, which is, we probably want a national
floor of decency regarding education, for each of our kids. But, this
notion of the state setting up their own tests, is going to be like the
Clean Water Act, where state standards, if established, are not very
informative because they cannot be compared across states.

Peter Lehner:
Depending on how you count, forty percent of waters.

Shelley Metzenbaum:
Are clean?

Peter Lehner:
Are not clean. Don't meet the standards that the states have set
for them.

Shelley Metzenbaum:
But only thirty percent of the waters are even monitored. If that.
It's like fourteen percent in some kinds of water bodies. So, we don't
even know if state programs are working or not because no one is
measuring the water quality. When I ~ear people talk about the
laboratories of democracy, I keep coming back to this measurement
issue and the need for the federal government to really force
standardized, credible, and comparable measurement of these
outcomes that we care about. That will let us see how far we are
relative to the floor of decency. But also, if we're going to have these
laboratories, you can't have them if there are no scientists in the
laboratory evaluating the experiments and if they're all using
different kinds of instruments to evaluate it with. You've got to
have some comparable metrics.
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Don Friedman:
Richard Nathan invited us to rise and be principled in this
discussion and I decline that invitation. I just spent two days
lobbying the legislature, so how could I possibly do that? I do want
to ask, in the welfare context, what has been the impact of welfare
reform and its devolution? What has been happening? You did
mention a few good things that have been done, and I would agree,
by some states.
But overall, we may not agree with this
assessment, but we have some information about what's happening.
First of all, we probably all know the welfare rolls have gone
down dramatically. From as much as ninety percent declines to I
don't think any states lost less than fifty percent of its welfare
population. So, around the country, there has been a huge decline
in welfare rolls. Many people would define that, in fact, I believe
that's a defining fact of welfare reform success. What's happened to
the people who are leaving the rolls? Many of them are working. A
very large percentage of them who are working are doing as poorly
or worse than they were doing when they were on welfare. They
have some increased costs and they're not matched by their
earnings, they tend to be low wage, temporary, no benefit jobs,
without any chance for advancement. Many people who were
working and left the rolls are back on the rolls. That has always
been true that there is a lot of cycling on and off. Many of those
who are off the rolls are not working. One of the most important
reasons why people are off the rolls is because they were sanctioned
off the rolls. Sanction is the punishment of people on welfare who
have not complied with the rules and, as I would submit, is the
driving force of all of the welfare activity. Actually, one research
piece that I read recently said that in a three month period, forty
percent of the caseload decline in the nation was explainable by
sanctions. Not jobs, but sanctions. Because of the strong economy
there has been some reduction in poverty. I say because of the
economy because I don't think that welfare reform has anything to
do with the decline in poverty. Something I do think is attributable
to welfare reform is that to the extent that people are poor, there is
deeper poverty. The number of people who are deep in poverty has
been increasing in these boom times.
But, the last thing I just want to say that gets a little more
directly to the federalism discussion is that a number of states have
Let me use Wisconsin rather than
done interesting things.
generalize. We'll use one state. They did interesting things after
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they cut eighty percent of their case load. If you weight the good
things, some more money for child care, some more money for
education and training, against the bad, namely an eighty percent
reduction in caseload, it's a mismatch. The damage has been done.

Richard Nathan:
I'm not here to argue about welfare, but what they've done in
Wisconsin has served people who are working. They've spent more
money than they've ever spent before, for more services to help
working families. You can't just talk about the cash assistance
caseload decline and be telling enough. I'm not saying you're wrong,
but I don't think we should just talk about one person's view of
welfare reform in Wisconsin.

David Markell'
To sum up in terms of this issue, notably what systems and
policies have been effective, I think you can, as Shelley was saying,
glean a few general principles from the discussion. One of them is
that, at least in a couple of the contexts, there is a federal floor that
seems to have motivated the states to a certain level of
performance. Thus, there is the suggestion that a federal floor is
valuable in promoting enhanced performance.
The second issue is the issue of sanctions. Andy remarked before
that one of the things New York has done that is positive is to use
federal authority in ways that sometimes the feds themselves
haven't used. The idea is that the creation, and existence, of federal
authority, regardless of who is exercising that authority, is a way in
which the federal system has been constructive and productive.
The third issue is one that Peter Lehner focused on, empowering
citizens. Whether that is part of federalism, per se, or just part of
the federal infrastructure, is something that you can discuss, but
clearly it's an inherent part of the environmental laws. The
environmental laws empower citizens in a wide variety of ways,
ranging from bringing a suit themselves, to getting information so
they can vocalize and interact with regulated parties who are
engaging in pollution. Peter suggests that this is a third feature of
having a federal system that is paying dividends.
A fourth feature of the federal system that I'll close with hasn't
been mentioned here today but I don't think it should be ignored, is
the issue of capacity. The states in recent years have done an
enormous amount to increase capacity on their own to engage in

HeinOnline -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1121 2000-2001

1122

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 64

environmental protection and other activities. Many would say that
the federal government has played an instrumental role in
enhancing state capacity and giving the states the tools they need to
regulate and to engage in efforts to promote environmental
protection. So, these are four features of our federal system that
seem to have provided dividends in the view of one or more of our
panelists.
With that brief summary, let's turn to our fourth topic, the
obstacles to achieving an appropriate state federal balance and how
those can be overcome. I'll start with Erik.

Erik Olson:
I do think that there are three areas where the system has clearly
worked. One is the devolution to individuals, as Peter was saying,
in the situation of civil rights.
And, also certainly in the
environmental area that I'm familiar with. In that area there is a
direct federal standard and there are the individual citizens. Who
is closer to the people than the people themselves? Where you have
that situation, we actually have had some success. In California
they have succeeded at the state level with Proposition 65.
Proposition 65 was adopted, over the objection of virtually the entire
industrial complex in California, by the citizens. Now, citizens can
directly sue to enforce environmental standards. That's the only
strong citizen suit supervision that I know of in state law that was
basically and essentially adopted by citizens over the objection of
the state government as well as industry.
The second area that has been successful is where the federal
government can act unilaterally. I will offer a couple of examples,
such as lead phase-out in gasoline, which is documented to have
enormous impact in blood lead levels across the country, and the
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons, which has clearly had significant
environmental benefit. That is where there didn't have to be a
federalist argument.
The third area, and this is a little more murky, is where there
was a clear federal floor and clear sanctions for not meeting that at
the state level that were essentially self-executing.
That is
relatively rare in environmental law, but there are a few examples,
that I won't go into, where this actually worked. And, usually they
are where funding is automatically withdrawn and it's too bad if the
state doesn't adopt it. There isn't any discretion there. So, those
are a few bright lights that I think are worth highlighting.
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I was asked to talk about obstacles, and I think there are a lot of
them, and we've heard many of them touched upon. I'd like to do a
parade of horribles for some of the obstacles, and since I was just
Pollyanna and talked about all the successes, I do think that some
of the obstacles are more significant than others. I would say that
perhaps that the number one obstacle in the federalist debate right
now is the Supreme Court of the United States. I think that where
we are headed right now, there are several recent court decisions
under the Tenth Amendment, under the Eleventh Amendment, and
in interpreting the Commerce Clause, that are taking us in the
direction that I think is close to where we were in the time of
Lochner and Schechter Poultry. That is, close to the time when,
essentially, the federal government, for reasons that I view were
largely unprincipled, will be prohibited from moving into certain
areas of regulation, and the real reasons are that there are very
powerful interests in campaign finance. That's one area.
I would say my proof in the pudding of why this is unprincipled, is
every time I go up to Capitol Hill and I have these debates about
federalist issues, on one hand I hear how it is so important to
delegate and send things back to the states. However, when an
industry comes in and wants federal preemption, well, suddenly
that's not very important. It's very clear.
The other proof in the pudding is that now at least nineteen
states have adopted "no-more-stringent-than" clauses in the
environmental area. What does that mean? That means that the
state legislature, and I wonder who asked the state legislature to do
this, the state legislature says we can be no more stringent than the
least stringent federal rule. This is true in nineteen states now, but
it's not necessarily across the board in each state. That tells me
that the race to the bottom is quite real. That many states go as far
down to the bottom as they possibly can, and if you removed the
federal requirements, they would go all the way down to the bottom.
At least some states would. The reason for that, I think frankly, is
the campaign finance issue, political power, and realities.
That brings me to the underlying basic problem, which is the
power of money in the United States in the twenty-first century. I
think we all know it, but that's really the bottom line for a lot of
these problems. For the environmental problem and many others.
I'd like to talk about lofty principles, but I think that the bottom
line in many of these debates is, who has the money. The person
with the money is the one that controls the agenda and it is much
more difficult to overcome where it is invisible at the state level
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very often. Of course, it's very difficult to overcome, even at the
federal level.
At the state level, several identifiable obstacles are important.
There is the lack of funding staff and expertise at many states.
Very often, even if they have the political will, which is another
huge obstacle, the states simply cannot take on a major industry.
The industry can throw enormous resources and essentially wear
the state down to the point where a twenty-four year old kid
straight out of school who is tasked with fighting the thirty industry
lawyers simply cannot muster the attention and will to take them
on. The imbalance between power and between technical and
scientific expertise and resources is so enormous that it's a real
impediment to really delegating things very often at the state level.
Which is not to say that it doesn't happen at the federal level. It
certainly does.
Another significant issue, and frankly this is one of real concern,
is that at the state and local government level, very often there is no
public interest community. There is no watch dog. If there is a
watch dog, they're watching the entire state agency and they simply
don't have the expertise or ability to even know what's going on,
much less try to advocate. They don't have the resources, and they
don't have the expertise, and it makes it, essentially, a sham to say
that this is being delegated down to the state or local level, because
there isn't anybody to watch what's going on.
There is also a very significant problem of lack of public
disclosure and a lack of transparency at the state level. One
question in the written material is: would transparency help? Yes,
it would help. It's not going to solve the problem, if you've got a
huge industry that can overwhelm the resources of a small
community group. Having the permit available to the citizen-group
to read, it doesn't really help them very much or enable them to
understand how much Chromium IV is in their drinking water, it
may not help them very much if they don't know what Chromium
IV is.
The last significant impediment I wanted to mention is that, I
think the gorilla in the closet is being locked in the closet. The
solution that we often hear is, "Well, we need this federal gorilla in
the closet who can beat his chest and say, 'Well the state doesn't do
their job and then the federal government is going to come in and
step in to make sure that the state does.''' Well, that gorilla is
increasingly being locked into the closet and can't come out and,
therefore, as Peter just suggested, there isn't really the pressure for
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the states to go forward, so we have overall less enforcement effort,
less implementation effort, and with the Supreme Court decisions I
think that's only going to get worse.

Richard Nathan:
I'm trying to figure out about what we're talking about. The
comments you just made are supposed to be on federalism, but what
I hear you saying is that federalism, to you, means national control.
Could we do a balance sheet about a system that shares power
versus a system that doesn't share power? Ours is a system of
shared powers, that's how you should think about and assess
American federalism. That's really what we should be discussing.
There are pro factors for sharing power. Some states can
innovate and lead. We have diversity. You can decide you want to
strengthen community as a political value. In some areas you can
decide you want to enhance competition if states are trying to do
certain things that we would like them to compete to do better than
other states. What is the down side of sharing power? It seems to
me that's what the discussion ought to be, "What is the up side and
what's the down side of the kind of very subtle sharing of power
that we have in our political system?" And, I hear most of you
saying here that what federalism means to you is just, "Please have
more national power," which I don't think is all you should talk
about when you have a seminar on federalism.
On the other side of the ledger, I would put that the argument for
national power, which is most of what I have heard here, is that you
get uniformity. You can reduce the cost and effects of externalities.
You can, and this is what we have been seeing a lot, make it easier
for business to compete in the global economy. You can achieve
purposes that involve equal treatment across state boundaries of
citizens. (Equal bad and equal good, by the way).
What I think the audience should go away from this thinking, is
that there are arguments for and against sharing power. This is a
key point. Federalism is not necessarily a bad thing. Read the
Constitution.
Read the Federalist Papers about divided
responsibility and shared sovereignty. Shared in different ways.
It's very complicated. There are three ways that governments carry
out functions. They set standards, they pay for achieving them, and
they administer programs. Our sharing of power involves very
complicated mixtures of those three things for different functions.
Do you want to share power, or do you not, should be the federalism
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question that you should ponder when Professor David Markell
finishes moderating this forum.

David Markell:
Thanks, Dick. What I think we should do, because we are
running out of time, is give Peter a chance for a thirty second
comment, and then I'm going to invite questions and comments
from the audience.

Peter Lehner:
In response to what you were saying, it's important to distinguish
between federalism as a theory and federalism as a matter of
reality. I would argue, and as I said earlier, federalism in theory is
value neutral. State powers could be better if campaign finance
realities were different and, in fact, states were more responsive to
Then
individual concerns than other levels of government.
federalism would be a terrific tool for more civil rights, more
environmental protection. Given our poor campaign finance system
at all levels of government, however, it's arguably the federal
government that, in a weird way, is actually more responsive to
most people than are the state governments. You have to look at
federalism, or at least those of us who are living it look at it, as a
matter of reality. I would love to think of it as divorced from
campaign finance and the reality of how responsive state
governments are.
[Question & Answer Session Omitted]

David Markell:
This has been a very interesting discussion. We've had a very
active group of participants. Martha and I very much appreciate
your active engagement and your vigorous participation. And we
truly appreciate your venturing forth to Albany in February, the
day after a significant snow storm, to join us. For the audience, and
the participants, we have raised a lot of issues today. The purpose
of this conversation is to help to facilitate other conversations about
these very important principles. Again, four of the questions to
consider are the ones we outlined at the outset: 1) what are the
national interests at stake; 2) to what extent are they being
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effectively achieved; 3) what are some of the successes that we have
realized, how do we emulate those, and how can we communicate
them better; and 4) where have things gone awry, and how can we
learn from these experiences. The participants offered some very
insightful comments on each issue that we hope will inform your
thinking.
Participant Biographies:

Andrew G. Cellt: Jr.
Andrew G. Celli, Jr. is Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau in the
Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. The Civil
Rights Bureau conducts affirmative litigation, investigations, and
policy initiatives in the areas of reproductive rights, disability
rights, police misconduct, and discrimination in employment,
mortgage lending, housing, public accommodations, and other
sectors. The Bureau employs an "impact litigation" model to court
cases, drafts and proposes civil' rights-related legislation for
consideration by the State Legislature, releases reports, and
facilitates educational seminars on civil rights controversies around
the state. Finally, the Bureau assists the New York State Solicitor
General in the preparation and submission of amicus briefs in civil
rights cases of interest to the State. The Bureau is comprised of
twelve lawyers and includes a Reproductive Rights Unit and a
Disability Rights Project. As chief, Mr. Celli is responsible for
selecting cases, formulation of litigation strategy, and overall
supervision of the Bureau's docket.
Before joining the Attorney General's Office, Mr. Celli was a
partner in the firm of Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP
(1996-1999; previously Richard D. Emery, PC, 1993-1996), a firm
that specializes in plaintiffs civil rights, police misconduct, First
Amendment, and related matters. Prior to that, Mr. Celli was an
associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore (1991-1993), and a law clerk
to Hon. Charles P. Sifton, U.S. District Judge (E.D.N.Y.) (19901991). Mr. Celli is a 1990 cum laude graduate of the New York
University School of Law, where he was a member of the Law
Review and a Libel Law Fellow.
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Martha F. Davis
Martha Davis is Vice President and Legal Director of NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, an independent public interest legal
and advocacy organization. As legal director, Ms. Davis oversees
NOW Legal Defense litigation and advocacy in the areas of
economic justice, violence against women, education, reproductive
Her Supreme Court litigation has
rights, and employment.
included u.s. v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11740 (2000), which addressed
federalism issues, and Nguyen v. INS, which she argued before the
Court in January of this year. The focus of Ms. Davis' work has
been economic justice, and she writes and speaks frequently on the
legal rights of poor women. Ms. Davis is the author of the
prizewinning book Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Wellare Rights
Movement, as well as an adjunct professor at the New York
University School of Law. In 1998, she was named a Wasserstein
Fellow at Harvard Law School in recognition of her public interest
work, and in the fall of 2000 she served as the inaugural Kate
Stoneman Visiting Professor of Law and Democracy at Albany Law
School. Ms. Davis holds a B.A. from Harvard University, an M.A.
(Oxon.) from Oxford University, and a J.D. from the University of
Chicago.

Peter Edelman
Peter Edelman is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center where he has been on the faculty since 1982. He took
leave from 1993 to 1996 to serve in the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, first as Counselor to Donna Shalala and then
as Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. Professor
Edelman was Associate Dean of the Law Center in the late 1980s,
Director of the New York State Division for Youth in the late 1970s,
and Vice President of the University of Massachusetts before that.
He was a Legislative Assistant to Senator Robert F. Kennedy from
1965 to 1968 and was Issues Director for Senator Edward
Kennedy's Presidential campaign in 1980. He served as Law Clerk
to Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg in 1962-63 and before
that to Judge Henry J. Friendly on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and was Special Assistant to Assistant Attorney
General John Douglas in the U.S. Department of Justice following
his Supreme Court clerkship.
Professor Edelman's book, Searching lor Americas Heart,- RFK
and the Renewal 01 Hope, was published by Houghton-Mifflin in
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January 2001. He is the author of many articles on poverty,
constitutional law, and issues relating to children and youth. His
article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled, "The Worst Thing Bill
Clinton Has Done" received the Harry Chapin Media Award.
Professor Edelman grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
attended Harvard College and Harvard Law School.

.Don Friedman
Don Friedman is a Senior Policy analyst with the Community
Food Resource Center, a non-profit organization that addresses
food, hunger, nutrition, and income issues in New York City. In
that capacity, he focuses particularly on welfare and welfare reform
issues, engaging in advocacy, education, and advice concerning
public assistance issues. Before joining CFRC, Friedman worked
for 21 years as a staff attorney and then as a government benefits
specialist with Legal Services for New York City. He also teaches in
the Urban Studies Department at Queens College. Friedman
obtained his RA. from the University of Michigan, and his J.D.
from Harvard Law School.

Peter Lehner
Peter Lehner is currently the Chief of the Environmental
Protection Bureau in the New York Attorney General's office. The
Bureau both enforces state and federal environmental laws and
defends state agencies when sued on environmental matters.
Lehner worked previously for five years at the Natural Resources
Defense Council, where he was senior attorney and director of the
Clean Water Project. From 1985-1994, Peter worked with the New
York City Law Department, first in the Affirmative Litigation
Division and later as Deputy Chief of the Environmental Law
Division. He also teaches environmental law at Columbia Law
School. Lehner obtained his J.D. from Columbia Law School in
1984, and his RA. from Harvard College. He clerked for Chief
Judge James Browning of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit .

.David L. Markell
Professor David L. Markell joined the Albany Law School faculty
in 1992. He teaches a series of environmental law and other
courses at the Law School. Professor Markell is the author of
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numerous publications on environmental law and related topics.
One book co-authored by Professor Markell received the Award for
Scholarship from the American Bar Association Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice and was designated
the "most outstanding work of legal scholarship in the field"
published in 1995. Professor Markell has been actively involved in
environmental issues at the international, national (U.S.), state,
and local levels while a member of the Albany Law School faculty.
He has testified numerous times before the U.S. Congress and the
New York State Legislature. He also has served on several work
group and other advisory bodies. Professor Markell serves as a
member of the New York State Bar Association Environmental Law
Section's Committee, and in 1997 received its Certificate of
Achievement award. Professor Markell took a leave of absence from
the Law School between August 198 and June 2000 to serve as
Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters, for the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC).
Prior to joining the Albany Law School faculty in 1992, Professor
Markell served as Director of the Division of Environmental
Enforcement for the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC). He also has served as an attorney with the
United States Environmental Protection Agency and as a Trial
Attorney with the United States Department of Justice's
Environmental Enforcement Section. Professor Markell is a 1975
magna cum laude graduate of Brandeis University and a 1979
graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law.
Shelley H Metzenbaum
Shelley H. Metzenbaum is a Visiting Professor at the University
of Maryland's School of Public Mfairs, where she leads the
Environmental Compliance Consortium, a project that brings state
environmental protection agencies together to develop better ways
to measure and manage state environmental compliance and
enforcement programs.
She also serves as Director of the
Performance Management Project at the Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, a project that convened public
and private leaders from the federal, state, and local level to
identify ways to make public sector performance measurement more
useful. Professor Metzenbaum is the author of several articles on
ways to strengthen the environmental protection system by making
it more information-driven and performance focused.
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During the first term of the Clinton Administration, Professor
Metzenbaum served as Associate Administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for Regional Operations and
State/Local Relations. As Associate Administrator, she managed
the design and. implementation of the National Environmental
Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) and the Sustainable
Development Challenge Grant program. Previously, Metzenbaum
served as Undersecretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of
Environmental Mfairs (EOEA)., As Undersecretary, she initiated a
program that certifies private sector third-parties to oversee cleanups of contaminated sites, greatly accelerating the clean-up of all
but the most seriously contaminated sites. She also launched the
"money-back-guarantee" permit reform program.
Under this
program, which has since been replicated in several states, the
business community agreed to pay higher fees to cover the cost of
permit review and compliance assurance and the state committed to
speedier action-although not assured approval-of permits. Prior
to serving as Undersecretary, Professor Metzenbaum was Director
of Capital Budgeting for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Professor Metzenbaum holds a Ph.D. and Masters degree from the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and a B.A.
degree in Humanities and Asian Studies from Stanford University.

Richard Nathan
Richard Nathan directs the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of
Government, the public policy research arm of the State University
of New York, which is located in Albany. Prior to coming to Albany,
he was a professor at Princeton and before that a Senior Fellow at
The Brookings Institution.
His government service includes
directing domestic policy research for the National Commission on
Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and the national
campaigns of Nelson A. Rockefeller. He was assistant director for
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and deputy
undersecretary for welfare reform of the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. His books include Implementing the
Personal Responsibility Act of 1996: A First Look (Rockefeller
Institute Press, 1999), Turning Promises Into Performance
(Columbia University Press, 1993), and Social Science in
Government (Rockefeller Institute Press, 2000). Nathan is an
advisor to the U.S. General Accounting Office.
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Erik.D. Olson
Erik D. Olson joined the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) in 1991 as a Senior Attorney, specializing in public health
issues including drinking water, pesticides, toxics, and food safety.
Mr. Olson is the National Coordinator of the Campaign for Safe and
Mfordable Drinking Water, a coalition of over 300 public health,
environmental, consumer, and other groups dedicated to improving
drinking water protection. He is also the Coordinator for the D.C.
Area Water Consumers Organized for Protection (D.C. Area Water
COPs), a coalition of local citizen, public health, environmental, and
other groups fighting for better drinking water in the Nation's
Capital.
Erik also sits on the EPA-American Water Works
Association Research Committee. Until 1997 he served as the
national
environmental
group
representative
on
the
congressionally-chartered National Drinking Water Advisory
Council. From 1986-1992, he was counsel for the Environmental
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